Abstract. Multilinear maps have become popular tools for designing cryptographic schemes since a first approximate realisation candidate was proposed by Garg, Gentry and Halevi (GGH). This construction was later improved by Langlois, Stehlé and Steinfeld who proposed GGHLite which offers smaller parameter sizes. In this work, we provide the first implementation of such approximate multilinear maps based on ideal lattices. Implementing GGH-like schemes naively would not allow instantiating it for non-trivial parameter sizes. We hence propose a strategy which reduces parameter sizes further and several technical improvements to allow for an efficient implementation. In particular, since finding a prime generator for some ideal when generating instances is an expensive operation, we show how we can drop this requirement. We also propose algorithms and implementations for sampling from discrete Gaussians, for inverting in some Cyclotomic number fields and for computing norms of ideals in some Cyclotomic number rings. Due to our improvements we were able to compute a multilinear jigsaw puzzle for κ " 52 (resp. κ " 38) and λ " 52 (resp. λ " 80).
Introduction
Multilinear maps, starting with bilinear ones, are popular tools for designing cryptosystems. When pairings were introduced to cryptography [Jou04] , many previously unreachable cryptographic primitives, such as identity-based encryption [BF03] , became possible to construct. Maps of higher degree of linearity were conjectured to be hard to find -at least in the "realm of algebraic geometry" [BS03] . But in 2013, Garg, Gentry and Halevi [GGH13a] proposed a construction, relying on ideal lattices, of a so-called "graded encoding scheme" that approximates the concept of a cryptographic multilinear map.
As expected, graded encoding schemes quickly found many applications in cryptography. Already in [GGH13a] the authors showed how to generalise the 3-partite Diffie-Hellman key exchange first constructed with cryptographic bilinear maps [BS03] to N parties: the protocol allows N users to share a secret key with only one broadcast message each. Furthermore, a graded encoding scheme also allows constructing very efficient broadcast encryption [BS03, BWZ14] : a broadcaster can encrypt a message and send it to a group where only a part of it (decided by the broadcaster before encrypting) will be able to read it. Moreover, [GGH`13b] introduced indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) and functional encryption based on a variant of multilinear maps and some additional assumptions.
The GGH scheme. For a multilinearity parameter κ, the principle of the symmetric GGH graded encoding scheme is as follows: given a ring R and a principal ideal I generated by a small secret element g P R, a plaintext is a small element of R{I and is viewed as a level-0 encoding. Given a level-0 encoding, it is easy increase the level to a higher level i ď κ, but it is assumed hard to come back to an inferior level. The encodings are additively homomorphic at the same level, and multiplicatively homomorphic up to κ operations. The multiplication of a level-i and a level-j encoding gives a level-pi`jq encoding. Additionally, a zero-testing parameter p zt allows testing if a level-κ element is an encoding of 0, and hence also allows testing if two level-κ encodings are encoding the same elements. Finally, the extraction procedure uses p zt to extract bits which are a "canonical" representation of a ring element given its level-κ encoding.
More precisely, in GGH we are given R " Z rXs {pX n`1 q, where n is a power of 2, a secret element z uniformly sampled in R q " R{qR (for a certain prime number q), and a public element y which is a level-1 encoding of 1 of the form ra{zs q for some small a in the coset 1`I. We are also given m level-i encodings of 0 named x piq j , for all 1 ď i ď κ, and a zero-testing parameter p zt . To encode an element of R{I at level-i (for i ď κ), we multiply it by y i in R q (which give an element of the form "
, where c is an arbitrary small coset representative). Then, we add a linear combination of encodings of 0 at level-i of the form ř j ρ j x piq j to it where the ρ j are sampled from a certain discrete Gaussian. This last step is the re-randomisation process and ought to ensure that the analogue of the discrete logarithm problem is hard: going from level-i to level-0, for example by multiplying the encoding by y´i. We will see later that the encodings of zero made public for this step are a problem for the security of the scheme.
The asymmetric variant of this scheme replaces levels by "groups" which are identified with subsets of t1, . . . , κu. Addition of two elements in the same group stays within the group, multiplying two elements of different groups with disjoint index sets produces an element in the group defined by the union of their index sets. These groups are realised by defining one z i for each index 1 ď i ď κ and then dividing by the appropriate product of z i . Given a group characterised by S Ď t1, . . . , κu we call the cardinality of S its level.
We can distinguish between GGH instances where encodings of zero are made publicly available to allow anyone to encode elements and those where this is not the case. The latter are also called "Multilinear Jigsaw Puzzles" and were introduced in [GGH`13b] as a building block for indistinguishability obfuscation. Such instances can be thought of as secret-key graded encoding schemes. To distinguish the two cases, we denote those instances where no encodings of zero x piq j are published as GGH s . In such instances the secret elements g and z i are required to encode elements at levels above zero.
Security. Already in [GGH13a] it was shown that an attacker can recover the ideal pgq and the coset of pgq for any encoding at level ď κ if encodings of zero are made available. However, since these representatives of either pgq or the cosets are not small, it was believed that these "weak discrete log" attacks would not undermine the central security goal of GGH -the analogue of the BDDH assumption. However, in [HJ15] it was shown that these attacks can be extended to recover short representatives of the cosets. As a consequence, if encodings of zero are published, then [HJ15] breaks the GGH security goals in many scenarios and it is not clear, at present, if and how GGH-like graded encoding schemes can be defended against such attacks. A candidate proposal to prevent weak discrete logarithm attacks was proposed in [CLT15, Appendix G] , where the strategy is to change zero testing to make it non-linear in the encodings such that the attack does not work anymore. However, no security analyses was provided in [CLT15] and revision 20150516:083005 of [CLT15] drops any mention of this candidate fix. Hence, the status of GGHlike schemes where encodings of zero are published is currently unclear. However, we note that GGH s , where no encodings of zero are made available, does not appear to be vulnerable to weak discrete log attacks. This version is a central building block of indistinguishability obfuscation, i.e. this case has important applications despite being more limited in functionality.
Alternative Constructions. An alternative instantiation of graded encoding schemes over the integers promising practicality was proposed by Coron, Lepoint and Tibouchi [CLT13] . This first proposal was also broken in polynomial time using public encodings of zero in [CHL`15]. The attack was later generalised in [GHMS14] and a candidate defence against these attacks was proposed in [CLT15] . The authors of [CLT15] also provided a C++ implementation of a heuristic variant of this scheme. They report that the Setup phase of an 7-partite Diffie-Hellman key exchange takes 4528s (parallelised on 16 cores), publishing a share (Publish) takes 7.8s per party (single core) and the final key derivation (KeyGen) takes 23.9s per party (single core) for a level of security λ " 80.
Instantiation. The implementation reported in [CLT15] is to date the only implementation of a candidate graded encoding scheme. This is partly because instantiating the original GGH construction is too costly in practice for anything but toy instances. In 2014, Langlois, Stehlé and Steinfeld [LSS14a] proposed a variant of GGH called GGHLite, improving the re-randomisation process of the original scheme. It reduces the number m of re-randomisers, public encodings of zero, needed from Ωpn log nq to 2 and also the size of the parameter σ ‹ i of the Gaussian used to sample multipliers ρ j during the re-randomisation phase from r Op2 λ λ n 4.5 κq to r Opn
5.5
? κq. These improvements allow reducing the size of the public parameters and improving the overall efficiency of the scheme. But even though [LSS14a] made a step forward towards efficiency and in some cases no public re-randomisation is required at all (GGH s ), GGH-like schemes are still far from being practical.
Our contribution. Our main contribution is a first and efficient implementation of improved GGHlike schemes which we make publicly available under an open-source license. This implementation covers symmetric and asymmetric flavours and we allow encodings of zero to be published or not. Since the security of GGH-like constructions is unclear when encodings of zero are published, we do not discuss this variant here. We note, however, that our implementation provides a good basis for implementing any future fixes and improvements for GGH-based graded encoding schemes.
Implementing GGH-like schemes efficiently such that non-trivial levels of multilinearity and security can be achieved is not straight forward and to obtain an implementation we had to address several issues. In particular, we contribute the following improvements to make GGH-like multilinear maps more practical:
‚ We show that we do not require pgq to be a prime ideal for the existing proofs to go through.
Indeed, sampling an element g P Z rXs {pX n`1 q such that the ideal it generates is prime, as required by GGH and GGHLite, is a prohibitively expensive operation. Avoiding this check is then a key step to allow us to go beyond toy instances. ‚ We give a strategy to choose practical parameters for the scheme and extend the analysis of [LSS14a] to ensure the correctness of all the procedures of the scheme. Our refined analysis reduces the bitsize of q by a factor of about 4, which in turn reduces the required dimension n. ‚ We apply the analyses from [CS97] to pick parameters to defend against lattice attacks. ‚ For all steps during the instance generation we provide implementations and algorithms which work in quasi-linear time and efficiently in practice. In particular, we provide algorithms and implementations for inverting in some Cyclotomic number fields, for computing norms of ideals in some Cyclotomic number rings, for producing short representatives of elements modulo pgq and for sampling from discrete Gaussians in r Opnq. For the latter we use Ducas and Nguyen's strategy [Duc13] Our implementation of these operations might be of independent interest (cf. [LP15] for recent work on efficient sampling from a discrete Gaussian distribution), which is why they are available as a separate module in our code. ‚ We discuss our implementation and report on experimental results.
Our results (cf . Table 1 ) are promising, as we manage to compute up to multilinearity level κ " 52 (resp. κ " 38) at security level κ " 52 (resp. λ " 80) in the asymmetric GGH s case. We note that much smaller levels of multilinearity have been used to realise non-trivial functionality in the literature. For example, [BLR`14] reports on comparisons between 16-bit encrypted values using a 9-linear map (however, this result holds in a generic multilinear map model). We note that the results in Table 1 , where no encodings of zero are made available, are not directly comparable with those reported in [CLT15] .
Technical overview. Our implementation relies on FLINT [HJP14] . However, we provide our own specialised implementations for operations in the ring of integers of Cyclotomic number fields where the degree is a power of two and related rings as listed above.
Our variant of GGH foregoes checking if g generates a prime ideal. During instance generation [GGH13a, LSS14a] specify to sample g such that pgq is a prime ideal. This condition is needed Table 1 . Computing a κ-level asymmetric multilinear maps with our implementation without encodings of zero. Column λ gives the minimum security level we accepted, column λ 1 gives the actually expected security level based on the best known attacks for the given parameter sizes. Timings produced on Intel Xeon CPU E5-2667 v2 3.30GHz with 256GB of RAM, parallelised on 16 cores, but not all operations took full advantage of all cores. Setup gives the time for generating the GGH instance. Encode lists the time it takes to reduce an element P Z p with p " N pIq to a small element in Z rXs { pX n`1 q modulo pgq. Mult lists the time to multiply κ elements. All times are wall times.
in [GGH13a, LSS14a] to ensure that no non-zero encoding passes the zero-testing test and to argue that the non-interactive N -partite key exchange produces a shared key with sufficient entropy. We show that for both arguments we can drop the requirement that g generates a prime ideal. This was already mentioned as a potential improvement in [Gar13, Section 6.3] but not shown there. As rejection sampling until a prime ideal pgq is found is prohibitively expensive due to the low density of prime ideals in Z rXs {pX n`1 q, this allows speeding-up instance generation such that non-trivial instances are possible. We also provide fast algorithms and implementations for checking if pgq Ă Z rXs {pX n`1 q is prime for applications which still require prime pgq. We also improve the size of the two parameters q and compared to [LSS14a] . We first perform a finer analysis than [LSS14a] , which allows us to reduce the size of the parameter q by a factor 2. Then, we introduce a new parameter ξ, which controls what fraction of q is considered "small", i.e. passes the zero-testing test, which reduces the size of q further. This also reduces the number of bits extracted from each coefficient . Indeed, instead of setting " 1{4 log q´λ where λ is the security parameter, we set " ξ log q´λ with 0 ă ξ ď 1{4. We then show that for a good choice of ξ this is enough to ensure the correctness of the extraction procedure and the security of the scheme. Overall, our refined analysis allows us to reduce the size of q « p3n
which, in turn, allows reducing the dimension n. When no encodings of zero are published we simply set σ ‹ 1 " 1 and apply the same analysis.
Open problems. The most pressing question at this point is whether GGH-like constructions are secure. There exist no security proofs for any variant and recent cryptanalysis results recommend caution. Even speculating that secure variants of GGH-like multilinear maps can be found, performance is still an issue. While we manage to compute approximate multilinear maps for relatively high levels of κ in this work, all known schemes are still at least quadratic in κ which presents a major obstacle to efficiency. Any improvement which would reduce this to something linear in κ would mean a significant step forward. Finally, establishing better estimates for lattice reduction and tuning the parameter choices of our schemes are areas of future work. For example, it is clear that our analysis, where we simply set σ ‹ 1 " 1 when no encodings of zero are published, can be refined further.
Roadmap. We give some preliminaries in Section 2. In Section 3 we describe the GGH-like asymmetric graded encoding schemes and the multilinear jigsaw puzzles used for iO. In Section 4, we explain our modifications to GGH-like schemes, especially concerning the parameter q. We also recall a lattice attack to derive the parameter n and show that we do not require pgq to be prime. In Section 5, we give the details of our implementation.
Preliminaries
Lattices and ideal lattices. An m-dimensional lattice L is an additive subgroup of R m . A lattice L can be described by its basis B " tb 1 , b 2 , . . . , b k u, with b i P R m , consisting in k linearly independent vectors, for some k ď m, called the rank of the lattice. If k " m, we say that the lattice has fullrank. The lattice L spanned by B is given by L " t ř k i"1 c i¨bi , c i P Zu. The volume of the lattice L, denoted by volpLq, is the volume of the parallelepiped defined by its basis vectors. We have volpLq " a detpB T Bq, where B is any basis of L. For n a power of two, let f pXq P Z rXs be a monic polynomial of degree n (in our case, f pXq " X n`1 ). Then, the polynomial ring R " Z rXs {f pXq is isomorphic to the integer lattice Z n , i.e. we can identify an element upXq " ř n´1 i"0 u i¨X i P R with its corresponding coefficient vector pu 0 , u 1 , . . . , u n´1 q. We also define R q " R{qR " Z q rXs{pX n`1 q (isomorphic to Z n q ) for a large prime q and K " Q rXs {pX n`1 q (isomorphic to Q n ). Given an element g P R, we denote by I the principal ideal in R generated by g: pgq " tg¨u : u P Ru. The ideal pgq is also called an ideal lattice and can be represented by its Z-basis pg, X¨g, . . . , X n´1¨g q. We denote by N pgq its norm. For any y P R, let rys g be the reduction of y modulo I. That is, rys g is the unique element in R such that y´rys g P pgq and rys g " ř n´1 i"0 y i X i g, with y i P r´1{2, 1{2q, @i, 0 ď i ď n´1. Following [LSS14a] we abuse notation and let σ n pbq denotes the last singular value of the matrix rotpbq P Z nˆn , for any b P I. For z P R, we denote by MSB P t0, 1u
¨n the most significant bits of each of the n coefficients of z in R.
Gaussian distributions. For a vector c P R n and a positive parameter σ P R, we define the Gaussian distribution of centre c and width parameter σ as ρ σ,c pxq " expp´π q, for all x P R n . This notion can be extended to ellipsoid Gaussian distribution by replacing the parameter σ with the square root of the covariance matrix Σ " BB t P R nˆn with detpBq ‰ 0. We define it by ρ ? Σ,c pxq "
Then, the discrete Gaussian distribution over L with centre c and standard deviation σ (resp. ?
Σ ) when c is 0. Finally, for a fixed Y " py 1 , y 2 q P R 2 , we define: r E Y,s " y 1 D R,s`y2 D R,s as the distribution induced by sampling u " pu 1 , u 2 q P R 2 from a discrete spherical Gaussian with parameter s, and outputting y " y 1 u 1`y2 u 2 . It is shown in [LSS14a, Th. 5.1] that if Y¨R 2 " I and s ě maxp}g´1y 1 } 8 , }g´1y 2 } 8 q¨n¨a2 logp2np1`1{εqq{π for ε P p0, 1{2q, this distribution is statistically close to the Gaussian distribution D I,sY T .
GGH-like Asymmetric Graded Encoding Scheme
We now recall the definitions given in [GGH`13b, Section 2.2] for the notions of Jigsaw specifier, Multilinear Form and Multilinear Jigsaw puzzle. We refer to the original paper for the security of this construction.
Definition 1 ([GGH`13b, Def. 5]). A Jigsaw specifier is a tuple pκ, , Aq where κ, P Z`are parameters and A is a probabilistic circuit with the following behavior: On input a prime number q, A outputs the prime q and an ordered set of pairs pS 1 , a 1 q, . . . , pS , a q where each a i P Z q and each S i Ď rκs.
Definition 2 ([GGH`13b, Def. 6 and 7]).
A Multilinear Form is a tuple F " pκ, , Π, F q where κ, P Z`are parameters and Π is a circuit with imput wires, made out of binary and unary gates. F is an assignment of an index set I Ď rκs to every wire of Π. A multilinear form must satisfies constraints given in the original definition (on gates, and the output wire is assigned to rκs).
We say that a Multilinear Form F " pκ 1 , 1 , Π, F q is compatible with X " ppS 1 , a 1 q, . . . , pS , aif κ " κ 1 , " 1 and the input wires of Π are assigned to the sets S 1 , . . . , S . The evaluation of F on X is then doing arithmetic operations on the inputs depending on the gates. We say that the evaluation succeeds if the final output is prκs, 0q.
We now define the Multilinear Jigsaw Puzzles.
Jigsaw Generator: JGenpλ, κ, , Aq Ñ pq, X, puzzleq. This algorithm takes as input λ, and a Jigsaw specifier pκ, , Aq. It outputs a prime q, a private output X and a public output puzzle.
The generator is using a pair of PPT algorithms JGen " pInstGen, Encodeq.
InstGenpλ, κq Ñ pq, params, sq. This algorithm takes λ and κ as inputs and outputs pq, params, sq, where q is a prime of size at least 2 λ params is a description of public parameters, and s is a secret state to pass to the encoding algorithm. Encodepp, params, s, pS, aqq Ñ pS, uq. The encoding algorithm takes as inputs the prime q, the parameters params, the secret state s, and a pair pS, aq with S Ď rκs and a P Z q and outputs u, and encoding of a relative to S.
More precisely, the algorithm runs the Jigsaw specifier on input p to get pairs pS 1 , a 1 q, . . . , pS , a q. Then encodes all the plaintext elements by using the Encode algorithm on each pS i , a i q which return pS i , u i q. We have:
X " pq, pS 1 , a 1 q, . . . , pS , aand puzzle " pparams, pS 1 , u 1 q, . . . , pS , u qq.
Jigsaw Verifier: JVerppuzzle, Fq Ñ t0, 1u. This algorithm takes as input the public output of a Jigsaw Generator puzzle, and a multilinear form F. It outputs either accept p1q or reject p0q.
Correctness. For an output pq, X, puzzleq and a form F compatible with X, we say that the verifier JVer is correct if either the evaluation of F on X succeeds and JVerppuzzle, Fq " 1 either the evaluation fails and JVerppuzzle, Fq " 0. We require that with high probability over the randomness of the generator, the verifier will be correct on all form.
Security. The hardness assumptions for the Multilinear Jigsaw puzzle requires that for two different polynomial-size families of Jigsaw Specifier tpκ λ , λ , A λ qu λPZ`a nd tpκ λ , λ , A 1 λ qu λPZ`t he public output of the Jigsaw Generator on pκ λ , λ , A λ q will be computationally indistinguishable from the public output of the Jigsaw Generator on pκ λ , λ , A 1 λ q.
Using GGH to construct Jigsaw puzzles
In Figure 1 , we describe a GGH-like asymmetric graded encoding scheme without encodings of zero based on the definition of GGHLite from [LSS14a] .
We now explain how to use those procedure to construct the Jigsaw Generator, described in [GGH`13b, Appendix A].
Jigsaw Generator. The Jigsaw Generator uses InstGen to generate all the public (params and p zt ) and secret parameters of the multilinear map. Each level of the multilinear map will be associated with a subset of the set rκs. To create the puzzle pieces, which are encodings of some elements of R at different level, the Generator simply encodes some random elements at level S Ă r1, κs, those are given as puzzle.
‚ Instance generation. InstGenp1 λ , 1 κ q: Given security parameter λ and multilinearity parameter κ, determine scheme parameters n, q, σ, σ 1 , g´1 , b , as in [LSS14a] . Then proceed as follows:
‚ Sample g Ðâ DR,σ until }g´1} ď g´1 and I " pgq is a prime ideal. Define encoding domain Rg " R{ pgq. ‚ Sample zi Ðâ U pRqq for all 0 ă zi ď k.
q and define the zero-testing parameter pzt "
‚ Return public parameters params " pn, q, q and pzt. ‚ Encode at level-0 Enc0pparams, g, eq: Compute a small representative e 1 " res g and sample an element e 2 Ðâ D e 1`I ,σ 1 . Output e 2 . ‚ Encode in group tiu. Encpparams, zi, eq: Given level-0 encoding e P R, parameters params and zi, output re{zis q . ‚ Adding encodings. Add: Given encodings u1 " " c1{`ś iPS zi˘‰ q and u2 " " c2{`ś iPS zi˘‰ q with S Ď t1, . . . , κu:
‚ Return u " ru1`u2s q , an encoding of rc1`c2s q in the group S. ‚ Multiplying encodings. Mult: Let S1 Ă rκs, S2 Ă rκs with S1 X S2 " H, given an encoding u1 " " c1{´ś iPS 1 zi¯ı q and an encoding u2 "
‚ Return u " ru1¨u2s q , an encoding of rc1¨c2s q in S1 Y S2. ‚ Zero testing at level κ. isZeropparams, pzt, uq: Given an encoding u " " c{`ś κ´1 i"0 zi˘‰ q , return 1 if }rpztus q }8 ă q 3{4 and 0 else. Jigsaw Verifier. The verifier is given the public parameters params and p zt , a valid form Π (which is defined [GGH`13b, Def. 6] in as a circuit made of binary and unary gates) and puzzle, an input for Π (which are some encodings). The verifier is then evaluating Π on these input using Add for addition gates and Mult for multiplication gates. The verifier must succeeds if the evaluation of F on X succeeds, which means that the final output of the evaluation is an encoding of zero at level κ. The verifier is invoking the zero-testing procedure, and outputs 1 if the test passes, 0 otherwise.
Modifications to and parameters for GGH-like schemes
In this section, we first show that we do not require a prime pgq and then describe a method which allows to reduce the size of two parameters: the modulus q and the number of extracted bits. In Section 4.3 then we describe the lattice-attack against the scheme which we use to pick the dimension n. Finally, we describe our strategy to choose parameters that satisfy all these constraints.
Non-prime pgq
Both GGHLite and GGH-like jigsaw puzzles as specified in Figure 1 require to sample a g such that pgq is a prime ideal. However, finding such a g is prohibitively expensive. While checking each individual g whether pgq is a prime ideal is asymptotically not slower than polynomial multiplication, finding such a g requires to run this check often. The probability that an element generates a prime ideal is assumed to be roughly 1{pn c q for some constant c ą 1 [Gar13, Conjecture 5.18], so we expect to run this check n c times. Hence, the overall complexity is at least quadratic in n which is too expensive for anything but toy instances.
Primality of pgq is used in two proofs. Firstly, to ensure that after multiplying κ`1 elements in R g the product contains enough entropy. This is used to argue security of the N -partite noninteractive key exchange. Secondly, to prove that c¨h{g is big if c, h R g (cf. Lemma 2). Below, we show that we can relax the conditions on g for these two arguments to still go through, which then allows us to drop the condition that pgq should be prime. We note, though, that some other applications might still require g to be prime and that future attacks might find a way to exploit non-prime pgq.
Entropy of the product. The next lemma shows that excluding prime factors ď 2N and guaranteeing N pgq ě 2 n is sufficient to ensure 2λ bits of entropy in a product of κ`1 elements in R g with overwhelming probability. We note that both conditions hold with high probability, are easy to check and are indeed checked in our implementation. Lemma 1. Let κ ě 2, λ be the security parameter and g P Z rXs {pX n`1 q with norm p " N pgq ě 2 n such that p has no prime factors ď 2κ`2, and such that n ě κ¨λ¨logpλq. Then, with overwhelming probability, the product of κ`1 uniformly random elements in R g has at least κ¨λ¨logpλq{4 bits of entropy.
Proof. Write p " ś r i"1 p ei i where p i are distinct primes and e i ě 1 for all i. Let us consider the set S " ti P t1, . . . , ru : e i " 1u. Then, following [CDKD14] we define p s " ś iPS p i as the square-free part of p. Asymptotically, it holds that #tp ď x : p{p s ą p s u is cx 3{4 for some computable constant c (cf. [CDKD14] ). Since in our case we have x ě 2 n , this implies that with overwhelming probability it holds that p s ě ? p and hence logpp s q ě n{2.
By the Chinese Remainder Theorem, R g is isomorphic to F 1ˆ¨¨¨ˆFr where each "slot"
. The set of F i , for i P S corresponds to the square-free part of p. Those F i are fields, and each of them has order p i ě 2N which means that a random element in such F i is zero with probability 1{p i . In those slots, the product of N elements has E s bits of entropy, where
First, as p i ě 2N for all i P S, the quotient N {p i ď 1{2 and then´1´N pi¯ě 1{2 for all i P S. This implies that
Because logpp s q ě n{2, we conclude that E s ě n 4 ě κ¨λ¨logpλq 4
.
[ \ Probability of false positive. It remains to be shown that we can ensure that there are no false positives even if pgq is not prime. In [GGH13a, Lemma 3] false positives are ruled out as follows. Let u " rc{z κ s q where c is a short element in some coset of I, and let w " rp zt¨u s q , then we have w " rc¨h{gs q . The first step in [GGH13a] is to suppose that }g¨w} and }c¨h} are each at most q{2, then, since g¨w " c¨h mod q we have that g¨w " c¨h exactly. We also have an equality of ideals: pgq¨pwq " pcq¨phq, and then several cases are possible. If pgq is prime as in [GGH13a, Lemma 3], then pgq divides either pcq or phq and either c or h is in pgq. As, by construction, none of them is in pgq if c is not in I, either }g¨w} or }c¨h} is more than q{2. Using this, they conclude that there is no small c (not in I) such that w is small enough to be accepted by the zero-test.
Our approach is to simply notice that all we require is that pgq and phq are co-prime. Checking if pgq and phq are co-prime can be done by checking gcdpN pgq, N phqq " 1. However, computing N phq is rather costly because h is sampled from D Z n , ? q and hence has a large norm N phq. To deal with this issue we notice that if gcdpN pgq, N phqq ‰ 1 then we also have gcdpN pgq, N ph mod gqq ‰ 1 which can be verified with a simple calculation. Now, interpreting h mod g as "a small representative of h modulo g", we can compute h mod g as h´g¨tg´1¨hs, which produces an element of size « ? n¨}g}. We can use this observation to reduce the complexity of checking if pgq and phq are co-prime to computing two norms for elements of size }g} and « ? n¨}g} and taking their gcd. Furthermore, this condition holds with high probability, i.e. we only have to perform this test Op1q times. Indeed, by ruling out likely common prime factors first, we expect to run this test exactly once. Hence, checking co-primality of pgq and phq is much cheaper than finding a prime pgq but still rules out false positives.
Finally, we note that recent proposals of indistinguishability obfuscation from multilinear maps [Zim15,AB15] requires composite order maps. These are not the maps we are concerned with here as in [Zim15, AB15] it is assumed that the factorisation of pgq is known. However, we note that our techniques and implementation easily extend to this case by considering g " g 1¨g2 for known co-prime g 1 and g 2 .
Reducing the size of q
In this section show how to reduce q for which we consider the case where re-randomisers are published for level-1 but no other levels. This matches the requirements of the N -partite DiffieHellman key exchange but not the Jigsaw puzzle case. However, when no re-randomisers are published we may simply set σ ‹ 1 " 1 and apply the same analysis. Hence, assuming that rerandomisers are published fits our framework in all cases and makes our analysis compatible with previous work. We note that the analysis can be easily generalised to accommodate re-randomisers at higher levels than one by increasing q to accommodate "numerator growth".
The size of q is driven from both correctness and security considerations. To ensure the correctness of the zero-testing procedure, [LSS14a] showed the two following lower bounds on q. Eq. 1 implies that false negatives do not exist, and Eq. 2 implies that the probability of false positive occurrence is negligible:
The strongest constraint for q is given by the inequality q ą p3n
. It comes from the fact that for any level-κ encoding u of 0 (i.e., u P S p0q κ ), the inequality }p zt u} 8 ă q 3{4 has to hold. The condition is needed for the correctness of zero-testing and extraction.
New parameter ξ. The choice suggested in [LSS14a] is to extract " logpqq{4´λ bits from each element of the level-κ encoding. We show that this supplies much more entropy than needed and that we can sample a smaller fraction, " ξ logpqq´λ bits. The equation for q can be rewritten in terms of the variable ξ, by setting the initial condition }p zt u} 8 ă q 1´ξ .
Lemma 2 (Adapted from Lemma A.1 in [LSS14b] ). Let g P R and I " pgq, let c, h P R such that c R I, pgq and phq are co-prime, }c¨h} ă q{2 and q ą p2tnσq 1{ξ for some t ě 1 and any 0 ă ξ ď 1{4. Then }rc¨h{gs q } ą t¨q 1´ξ .
Proof. From [GGH13a, Lemma 3] and the discussion in Section 4.1 we know that since }c¨h} ă q{2
we must have › › ›g¨rc¨h{gs q › › › ą q{2 if pgq and phq are co-prime (note that c¨h ‰ g¨rc¨h{gs q in R{pX n`1 q). So we have
We have t¨q 1´ξ " t¨q{q ξ ă t¨q{p2tnσq " q{p2nσq and the claim follows.
[ \ Correctness of zero-testing. We can obtain a tighter bound on q by refining the analysis in [LSS14a] .
Recall that }rp zt us q } 8 " }rhc{gs q } 8 " }h¨c{g} 8 ď }h}¨}c{g} ď }h}¨}c}¨}g´1} ? n. The first inequality is a direct application of the inequalities between the infinity norm of a product and the product of the Euclidean norms, the second comes from [Gar13, Lemma 5.9].
Since h Ð D R, ? q , we have }h} ď ? nq 1{2 . Moreover, c can be written as a product of κ level-1 encodings u i , for i " 1, . . . , κ, i.e., c " ś κ i"1 u i . Thus, }c} ď p ? nq κ´1 pmax i"1,...,κ }u i }q κ since each of the κ´1 multiplications brings an extra ? n factor. Let u max be one of the u i of largest norm. It can be written as u max " e¨a`ρ 1¨b1 p1q`ρ 2¨b2 p1q . As we sampled the polynomial g such that › › g´1 › › ď l g´1 the inequality }rp zt us q } 8 ă q 1´ξ holds if: 
In [LSS14a], we had ξ " 1{4 (which give 2{p1´2ξq " 4), we hence have that this analysis allows to save a factor of 2 in the size of q even for the same ξ. If we additionally consider ξ ă 1{4 bigger improvements are possible. For practical parameter sizes we reduce the size of q by a factor of almost 4 because ξ tends towards zero as κ and λ grow.
Correctness of extraction. As in [LSS14a], we need that two level-κ encodings u and u 1 of different elements have different extracted elements, which implies that we need:
with L " tlog qu. This condition follows from Lemma 2 with t satisfying t¨q 1´ξ ą 2 L´ `1 , which holds for t " q ξ¨2´ `1 . As a consequence, the condition q ą p2tnσq 1{x is still satisfied if we have ą log 2 p8nσq, and to ensure that t ą 1 we need that ă ξ log q`2. Finally, to ensure that ε ext , the probability of the extraction to be the same for two different elements, is negligible, we need that ď ξ log 2 q´log 2 p2n{ε ext q.
Picking ξ and q. Putting all constraints together, we let " logp8nσq and
To find ξ we solve `λ " 2ξ 1´2ξ¨l ogq for ξ and set q "q 2 1´2ξ .
Lattice attacks
To pick a dimension n we rely on lattice attacks. The most efficient lattice attacks described [GGH13a] rely on computing weak discrete logarithms and hence do not seem to be applicable to either the case where no encodings of zero are published or the case where such attacks are ruled out in some other way. However, we may mount the attack from [CS97] against GGH-like graded encoding schemes. We explain it in the symmetric setting. Assume two encodings of random elements: u 1 " re 1 {zs q and u 2 " re 2 {zs q . We have
with e 1 and e 2 small. We set up the lattice Λ "ˆq I 0 X I˙w here I is the nˆn identity matrix, 0 is the nˆn zero matrix, and U a rotational basis for ru 1 {u 2 s q . By construction Λ contains the vector pe 1 , e 2 q which is short. We have detpΛq " q n and }pe 1 , e 2 q} « ? 2nσ 1 . In contrast, a random lattice with determinant q n and dimension 2n is expected to have a shortest vector of norm « q n{2n " ? q which is much longer than }pe 1 , e 2 q}. While Λ does not constitute a Unique-SVP instance because there are many short elements of norm roughly ? 2nσ 1 we may consider all of these "interesting". Clearly, there is a gap between those "interesting" vectors and the expected length of short vectors for random lattices. To hedge against potential attacks exploiting this gap, we may hence want to ensure that finding those "interesting" short vectors is hard. The hardness of Unique-SVP instances is determined by the ratio of the second shortest λ 2 pΛq and the shortest vector λ 1 pΛq of the lattice. We assume that the complexity of finding a short element in Λ depends on the gap between pe 1 , e 2 q and ? q in a similar way.
In order to succeed, an attacker needs to solve something akin of a Unique-SVP instance with gap λ 2 pΛq{λ 1 pΛq. We need to pick parameters such that this problem takes at least 2 λ operations. The most efficient technique known in the literature to produce short lattice vectors is to run lattice reduction. The quality of lattice reduction is typically expressed as the root-Hermite factor δ 0 . An algorithm with root-Hermite factor δ 0 is expected to output a vector v in a lattice L such that }v} " δ n 0 volpLq 1{n . Hence, in our case we require τ¨δ 2n 0 ď λ 2 pΛq{λ 1 pΛq and thus
where τ is a constant which depends on the lattice structure and on the reduction algorithm used.
, which we will use as an approximation. Currently, the most efficient algorithm for lattice reduction is a variant of the BKZ algorithm [SE94] referred to as BKZ 2.0 [CN11] . However, its running time and behaviour, especially in high dimensions, is not very well understood: there is no consensus in the literature as to how to relate a given δ 0 to computational cost. We estimate the cost of lattice reduction as in [APS15] .
We stress, though, that these assumptions requires further scrutiny. Firstly, this attack does not use p zt which means we expect that better lattice attacks can be found eventually. Secondly, we are assuming that the lattice reduction estimates in [APS15] are accurate. However, should these assumptions be falsified, then this part of the analysis can simply be replaced by refined estimates.
Putting everything together
Our overall strategy is as follows. Pick an n and compute parameters σ, σ 1 , σ ‹ 1 as in [LSS14a] and g and q as in Section 4.2. Now, establish the root-Hermite factor required to carry out the attack in Section 4.3 using Equation (5). If this δ 0 is small enough to satisfy security level λ terminate, otherwise double n and restart the procedure.
Implementation
Our implementation relies on FLINT [HJP14] . We use its data types to encode elements in Z rXs, Q rXs, and Z q rXs but re-implement most non-trivial operations for the ring of integers of a Cyclotomic number field where the degree is a power of two. Other operations -such as Gaussian sampling or taking approximate inverses -are not readily available in FLINT and are hence provided by our implementation. For computation with elements in R we use MPFR's mpfr_t [The13] with precision 2λ if not stated otherwise. Our implementation is available under the GPLv2+ license at https://bitbucket.org/malb/gghlite-flint. We give experimental results for computing multilinear maps using our implementation in Table 1 .
For many operations considered in this section straight-forward algorithms are available in O`n 3 log q˘bit operations. However, the smallest set of parameters we consider in Table 1 is n " 2 15 and log q « 2117 which implies that if implemented naively each operation would take 2 56 bit operations for the smallest set of parameters we consider. Even quadratic algorithms can be prohibitively expensive. Hence, in order to be feasible, all algorithms should run in quasi-linear time in n, or more precisely in Opn log nq. All algorithms discussed in this section run in quasi-linear time.
Polynomial Multiplication in
During the evaluation of a GGH-style graded encoding scheme multiplications of polynomials in Z q rXs{pX n`1 q are performed. Asymptotically fast multiplication in this ring can be realised by first reducing to multiplication in Z rXs and then to the Schönehage-Strassen algorithm for multiplying large integers in Opn log n log log nq. This is the strategy implemented in FLINT, which has a highly optimised implementation of the Schönehage-Strassen algorithm. Alternatively, we can get an Opn log nq algorithm by using the Number-Theoretic Transform (NTT). Furthermore, using a negative wrapped convolution we can avoid reductions modulo pX n`1 q:
Theorem 1 (Adapted from [Win96] ). Let ω n be a nth root of unity in Z q and ϕ 2 " ω n . Let a "
q and let a " pa 0 , ϕa 1 , . . . , ϕ n´1 a n´1 q and define b and c analogously. Then c " 1{n¨NTT´1 ωn pNTT ωn paq d NTT ωn pbqq.
The NTT with a negative wrapped convolution has been used in lattice-based cryptography before, e.g. [LMPR08] . We note that if we are doing many operations in Z q rXs{pX n`1 q we can avoid repeated conversions between coefficient and "evaluation" representations,`f p1q, f pω n q, . . . , f pω n´1 n q˘, of our elements, which reduces the amortised cost from Opn log nq to Opnq. That is, we can convert encodings to their evaluation representation once on creation and back only when running extraction. We implemented this strategy. We observe a considerable overall speed-up with the strategy of avoiding the conversions where possible. We also note that operations on elements in their evaluation representation are embarrassingly parallel.
Computing norms in Z rXs {pX
n`1 q During instance generation we have to compute several norms of elements in Z rXs {pX n`1 q. The norm N pf q of an element f in Z rXs {pX n`1 q is equal to the resultant respf, X n`1 q. The usual strategy for computing resultants over the integers is to use a multi-modular approach. That is, we compute resultants modulo many small primes q i and then combine the results using the Chinese Remainder Theorem. Resultants modulo a prime q i can be computed in OpM pnq log nq operations where M pnq is the cost of one multiplication in Z qi rXs{pX n`1 q. Hence, in our setting computing the norm costs Opn log 2 nq operations without specialisation. However, we can observe that respf, X n`1 q mod q i can be rewritten as ś pX n`1 qpxq"0 f pxq mod q i as X n`1 is monic, i.e. as evaluating f on all roots of X n`1 . Picking q i such that q i " 1 mod 2n this can be accomplished using the NTT reducing the cost mod q i to OpM pnqq saving a factor of log n, which in our case is typically ą 15.
Checking if pgq is a prime ideal
While we show in Section 4.1 that we do not require prime pgq for a non-interactive N -partite key exchange, some applications might still rely on this property. We hence provide an implementation for sampling such g. To check whether the ideal generated by g is prime in Z rXs {pX n`1 q we compute the norm N pgq and check if it is prime which is a sufficient but not necessary condition. However, before computing full resultants, we first check if respg, X n`1 q " 0 mod q i for several "interesting" primes q i . These primes are 2 and then all primes up to some bound with q i " 1 mod n because these occur with good probability as factors. We list timings in Table 2 . Table 2 . Average time of checking primality of a single pgq on Intel Xeon CPU E5-2667 v2 3.30GHz with 256GB of RAM using 16 cores i.e. if the respective ideal norms are co-prime. This check, which we have to perform for every candidate pair pb p1q 1 ,b p1q 2 q, involves computing two resultants and their gcd which is quite expensive. However, we observe that gcdprespb
Verifying that pb
q mod q i for any modulus q i . Hence, we first check this condition for several "interesting" primes and resample if this condition holds. These "interesting" primes are 2 and then all primes up to some bound with q i " 1 mod n because these occur with good probability as factors. Only if these tests pass, we compute two full resultants and their gcd. Indeed, after having ruled out small common prime factors it is quite unlikely that the gcd of the norms is not equal to one which means that with good probability we will perform this expensive step only once as a final verification. However, this step is still by far the most time consuming step during setup even with our optimisations applied. We note that a possible strategy for reducing setup time is to sample m ą 2 re-randomisers b p1q i and to apply some bounds on the probability of m elements b p1q i sharing a prime factor (after excluding small prime factors).
Computing the inverse of a polynomial modulo X n`1
Instance generation relies on inversion in Q rXs {pX n`1 q in two places. Firstly, when sampling g we have to check that the norm of its inverse is bounded by g . Secondly, to set up our discrete Gaussian samplers we need to run many inversions in an iterative process. We note that for computing the zero-testing parameter we only need to invert g in Z q rXs{pX n`1 q which can be realised in n inversions in Z q in the NTT representation.
In both cases where inversion in Q rXs {pX n`1 q is required approximate solutions are sufficient. In the first case we only need to estimate the size of g´1 and in the second case inversion is a subroutine of an approximation algorithm (see below). Hence, we implemented a variant of [BCMM98] to compute the approximate inverse of a polynomial in Q rXs {pX n`1 q, with n a power of two. The core idea is similar to the FFT, i.e. to reduce the inversion of f to the inversion of an element of degree n{2. Indeed, since n is even, f pXq is invertible modulo X n`1 if and only if f p´Xq is also invertible. By setting F pX 2 q " f pXqf p´Xq mod X n`1 , the inverse f´1pXq of f pXq satisfies F pX 2 q f´1pXq " f p´Xq pmod X n`1 q.
Let f´1pXq " gpXq " G e pX 2 q`XG o pX 2 q and f p´Xq " F e pX 2 q`XF o pX 2 q be split into their even and odd parts respectively. From Eq. 6, we obtain F pX 2 qpG e pX 2 q`XG o pX 2" F e pX 2 q`XF o pX 2 q pmod X n`1 q which is equivalent to
From this, inverting f pXq can be done by inverting F pX 2 q and multiplying polynomials of degree n{2. It remains to recursively call the inversion of F pY q modulo pX n{2`1 q (by setting Y " X 2 q. This leads to Algorithm 1 for approximately inverting elements of Q rXs {pX n`1 q when n is a power of 2, where we truncate the result of each recursive call to prec bits of precision.
Since Algorithm 1 reduces to polynomial multiplication and has log n iterations, it is easy to see that it can be performed in Opn log 2 pnqq operations in Q. Yet, since we truncate out operands in each recursive call, it is not immediately obvious that this algorithm indeed produces an answer that is even close to f´1pXq. Hence, we call Algorithm 1 in a loop, each time doubling the precision, until }f´1pXq¨f pXq´1} ă 2´p rec to ensure the accuracy of our result.
Algorithm 1 Approximate inverse of f pXq mod X n`1 using prec bits of precision
We give experimental results comparing Algorithm 1 with FLINT's extended GCD algorithm in Table 3 which highlights that computing approximate inverses instead of exact inverses is necessary for anything but toy instances. Table 3 . Inverting g Ðâ D Z n ,σ with FLINT's extended Euclidean algorithm ("xgcd"), our implementation with precision 160 ("160"), iterating our implementation until }f´1pXq¨f pXq} ă 2´1 60 ("160iter") and our implementation without truncation ("8") on Intel Core i7-4850HQ CPU at 2.30GHz, single core.
Small remainders
The Jigsaw Generator as defined in [GGH`13b, Definition 8] takes as input elements a i in Z p where p " N pIq and produces level encodings with respect to some source group S i . In particular, this algorithm produces some small representative of the coset a i modulo pgq from large integers of size « pσ ? nq n if we represents elements in Z p as integers 0 ď a i ă p. This can be accomplished by using Babai's trick and that g is small, i.e. by computing a i´g¨t g´1¨a i s in Q rXs {pX n`1 q. However, in order for this operation to produce sufficiently small elements, we need g´1 either exactly or with high precision. Computing such a high quality approximation of g´1 can be prohibitively expensive in terms of memory and time. Our strategy for computing with a lower precision is to rewrite a i as
where a ij ă 2 B for some B. Then, we compute small representatives for all 2 B¨j and a ij using an approximation of g´1 with precision B. Finally, we multiply the small representatives for 2 B¨j and a ij and add up their products. This produces a somewhat short element which we then reduce using our approximation of g´1 with precision B until its size does not decrease any more.
Sampling from a Discrete Gaussian
While the strategy in Section 5.6 produces short elements it does not necessarily produce elements which follow a spherical Gaussian distribution and hence do not leak geometric information about g. To produce such samples we need to sample from the discrete Gaussian D pgq,σ 1 ,c where c is a small representative of a coset of pgq. Furthermore, if encodings of zero are published, we are required to sample from D pgq,σ 1 ,0 and D pgq,σ 1 ,1 . For this, a fundamental building block is to sample from the integer lattice. We implemented a discrete Gaussian sampler over the integers both in arbitrary precision -using MPFR -and in double precision -using machine doubles. For both cases we implemented rejection sampling from a uniform distribution with and without table ("online") lookups [GPV08] and Ducas et al's sampler which samples from D Z,kσ2 where σ 2 is a constant [DDLL13, Algorithm 12]. Our implementation automatically chooses the best algorithm based on σ, c and τ (the tail cut). In our case σ is typically relatively large, so we call the latter whenever sampling with a centre c P Z and the former when c R Z. We list example timings of our discrete Gaussian sampler in Table 4 . We note that in our implementation we -conservativelyonly make use of the arbitrary precision implementation of this sampler with precision 2λ. Table 4 . Example timings for discrete Gaussian sampling over Z on Intel Core i7-4850HQ CPU at 2.30GHz, single core.
Using our discrete Gaussian sampler over the integers we implemented discrete Gaussian samplers over lattices. We implemented a variant of [Pei10] which we reproduce in Algorithm 2. Namely, we first observe that D pgq,σ 1 ,0 " g¨D R,σ 1¨g´T and then use [Pei10, Algorithm 1] to sample from D R,σ 1¨g´T where g´T is the conjugate of g´1. That is, g T 0 " g 0 and g T n´i "´g i for 1 ď i ă n for degpgq " n´1. We then proceed as follows. We first compute an approximate square root (see below) of Σ 1 2 " g´T¨g´1 up to λ bits of precision. We perform operations with logpnq`4 plogp ? n}σ}qq bits of precision. If the square root does not converge for this precision, we double it and start over. We then use this value, scaled appropriately, as the initial value from which to start computing a square-root of Σ 2 " σ 12¨g´T¨g´1´r2 with r " 2¨r ? log n s. We terminate when the square of the approximation is within distance 2´2 λ to Σ 2 . This typically happens quickly because our initial candidate is already very close to the target value.
Algorithm 2 Computing an approximate square root of σ 12¨g´T¨g´1´r2 . Given an approximation ? Σ 2 1 of ? Σ 2 we then sample a vector x Ðâ R n from a standard normal distribution and interpret it as a polynomial in Q rXs {pX n`1 q. We then compute y " ? Σ 2 1¨x in Q rXs {pX n`1 q and return g¨ptys r q, where tys r denotes sampling a vector in Z n where the i-th component follows D Z,r,yi . This algorithm is then easily extended to sample from arbitrary centres c. The whole algorithm is summarised in Algorithm 3 and we give experimental results in Table 5 . Table 5 . Approximate square roots of Σ 2 " σ 12¨g´T¨g´r2¨I for discrete Gaussian sampling over g with parameter σ 1 on Intel Core i7-4850HQ CPU at 2.30GHz, 2 cores for Denman-Beavers, 4 cores for estimating the scaling factor, one core for sampling. The last column lists the rate (samples per second) of sampling from D pgq,σ 1 .
Approximate square roots
Our Gaussian sampler requires an (approximate) square root in Q rXs {pX n`1 q. That is, for some input element Σ we want to compute some element
We use iterative methods as suggested in [Duc13, Section 6.5] which iteratively refine the approximation of the square root similar to Newton's method. Computing approximate square roots of matrices is a well studied research area with many algorithms known in the literature (cf. [Hig97] ). All algorithms with global convergence invoke approximate inversions in Q rXs {pX n`1 q for which we call our inversion algorithm. We implemented the Babylonian method, the Denman-Beavers iteration [DJ76] and the Padé iteration [Hig97] . Although the Babylonian method only involves one inversion which allows us to compute with lower precision, we used Denman-Beavers, since it converges faster in practice and can be parallelised on two cores. While the Padé iteration can be parallelised on arbitrarily many cores, the workload on each core is much greater than in the Denman-Beavers iteration and in our experiments only improved on the latter when more than 8 cores were used.
Most algorithms have quadratic convergence but in practice this does not assure rapid convergence as error can take many iterations to become small enough for quadratic convergence to be observed. This effect can be mitigated, i.e. convergence improved, by scaling the operands appropriately in each loop iteration of the approximation [Hig97, Section 3]. A common scaling scheme is to scale by the determinant which in our case means computing respf, X n`1 q for some f P Q rXs {pX n`1 q. Computing resultants in Q rXs {pX n`1 q reduces to computing resultants in Z rXs pX n`1 q. As discussed above, computing resultants in Z rXs {pX n`1 q can be expensive. However, since we are only interested in an approximation of the determinant for scaling, we can compute with reduced precision. For this, we clear all but the most significant bit for each coefficient's numerator and denominator of f to produce f 1 and compute respf 1 , X n`1 q. The effect of clearing out the lower order bits of f is to reduce the size of the integer representation in order to speed up the resultant computation. With this optimisation scaling by an approximation of the determinant is both fast and precise enough to produce fast convergence. See Table 5 for timings. attack to us and for helpful discussions. This work has been supported in part by ERC Starting Grant ERC-2013-StG-335086-LATTAC. The work of Albrecht was supported by EPSRC grant EP/L018543/1 "Multilinear Maps in Cryptography". Multpparams, i 1 , i 2 , u 1 , u 2 q Ñ u. The multiplication algorithm takes as inputs the parameters params, two levels i 1 and i 2 such that i 1`i2 ď κ, and a level-i 1 (resp. i 2 ) encoding u 1 P S pα1q i1 and u 2 P S pα2q i2 . It outputs a level-pi 1`i2 q encoding u 1ˆu2 P S pα1¨α2q i1`i2 . isZeropparams, p zt , uq Ñ t0, 1u. The zero-test algorithm takes as inputs the parameters params, the zero-testing parameter p zt and a level-κ encodings u P S pαq κ . It outputs 1 for every u P S p0q κ , and 0 otherwise, except with negligible probability:
Extpparams, p zt , uq Ñ s. The extraction algorithm takes as inputs the parameters params, the zerotesting parameter p zt and a level-κ encodings u P S pαq κ . It outputs s such that: 1. For a randomly chosen a Ð Samppparamsq, and two encodings of a: u 1 Ð Enc κ pparams, aq and u 2 Ð Enc κ pparams, aq then Pr rExtpparams, p zt , u 1 q " Extpparams, p zt , u 2 qs ě 1´negligiblepλq.
The distribution
is nearly uniform over t0, 1u λ .
B More Parameters
In this section we give additional parameter sets for multilinear jigsaw puzzles at various levels of security and multilinearity. These tables were produced using the Sage [S`13] module from Appendix C. Table 6 . Additional Parameters. f = lambda k : ( k /(2* pi_r * e_r ) * ( pi_r * k ) **(1/ k ) ) **(1/(2*( k -1) ) )
Return GGHLite parameter estimates for a given dimension 'n ' and multilinear ity level 'κ'.
: param n : lattice dimension , must be power of two : param kappa : multi lineari ty level 'κ>1 ' : param target_lambda : target security level : param xi :
pick 'ξ ' manually : param rerand :
is the instance supposed to support re -randomisation This should be true for 'N ' -partite DH key exchange and false for iO and friends . : param gddh_hard :
should the GDDH problem be hard : returns :
parameter choices for a GGHLite -like graded -encoding scheme """ n = ZZ ( n ) kappa = ZZ ( kappa ) RR = RealField (2* target_lambda ) sigma = RR (4* pi * n * sqrt ( e * log (8* n ) / pi ) ) ell_g = RR (4* sqrt ( pi * e * n ) /( sigma ) ) sigma_p = RR (7 * n **(2.5) * log ( n ) **(1.5) * sigma ) ell_b = RR (1.0/(2.0* sqrt ( pi * e * n ) ) * sigma_p ) eps = RR ( log ( target_lambda ) / kappa ) ell = RR ( log (8* n * sigma , 2) ) m = RR (2) if rerand : sigma_s = RR ( n **(1.5) * sigma_p **2 * sqrt (8* pi / eps ) / ell_b ) if gddh_hard : sigma_s *= 2** target_lambda * sqrt ( kappa ) * target_lambda / n else : sigma_s = 1 normk = sqrt ( n ) **( kappa -1) * (( sigma_p ) **2 * n ** RR (1.5) + 2* sigma_s * sigma_p * n ** RR (1.5) ) ** kappa q_base = RR ( n * ell_g * normk ) if xi is None : log_negl = target_lambda xivar = var ( ' xivar ') f = ( ell + log_negl ) == (2* xivar /(1 -2* xivar ) ) * log ( q_base , 2) xi = RR ( f . solve ( xivar ) [0] . rhs () ) q = q_base **( ZZ (2) /(1 -2* xi ) ) t = q ** xi * 2**( -ell + 2) assert ( q > 2* t * n * sigma **(1/ xi ) ) assert ( abs ( xi * log (q , 2) -log_negl -ell ) <= 0.1) else : q = q_base **( ZZ (2) /(1 -2* xi ) ) t = q ** xi * 2** ( if best [ " bkz2 " ] >= ZZ (2) ** l and best [ " sieve " ] >= ZZ (2) ** l : break n = 2* n return current def g g h l i t e _ l a t e x _ t a b l e (L , K , ** kwds ) :
""" Generate a table with parameter estimates for 'λ P L ' and 'κ P K '. line . append ( " %3 d " % current [ u "κ" ]) line . append ( " $2^{%2 d } $ " % log ( current [ " n " ] , 2) ) t = u " $«2^{%7.1 f } $ " % log ( current [ " q " ] , 2) . n () line . append ( u " %9 s " % (t ,) ) t = u " $«2^{%4.1 f } $ " % log ( current [ " | enc | " ] , 2) . n () line . append ( u " %9 s " % (t ,) ) t = u " $«2^{%4.1 f } $ " % log ( current [ " | par | " ] , 2) . n () line . append ( u " %9 s " % (t ,) ) line . append ( " %8.6 f " % current [ u "δ _0 " ]) t = u " $«2^{%5.1 f } $ " % log ( current [ u " bkz2 " ] , 2) line . append ( u " %9 s " % (t ,) ) t = u " $«2^{%5.1 f } $ " % log ( current [ u " sieve " ] , 2) line . append ( u " %9 s " % (t ,) ) ret . append ( 
